### 1NC 1

#### A – Interpretation:

#### Topical affirmatives must affirm the resolution through instrumental defense of action by the United States Federal Government.

#### B – Definitions

#### Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan

#### **American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com)**

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#### Federal government is the central government in Washington DC

Encarta Online 2005,

http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia\_1741500781\_6/United\_States\_(Government).html#howtocite

United States (Government), the combination of federal, state, and local laws, bodies, and agencies that is responsible for carrying out the operations of the United States. The federal government of the United States is centered in [Washington, D.C.](http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761576320/Washington_D_C.html)

#### Resolved implies a policy

Louisiana House 3-8-2005, <http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### C – Vote neg – We have four net benefits

#### First is Decisionmaking

#### The primary purpose of debate should be to improve our skills as decision-makers. We are all individual policy-makers who make choices every day that affect us and those around us. We have an obligation to the people affected by our decisions to use debate as a method for honing these critical thinking and information processing abilities.

Austin J. Freeley and David L. Steinberg – John Carroll University / U Miami – 2009, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p. 1-4, googlebooks

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.¶ Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.¶ Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.¶ We all make many decisions every day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?¶ Is the defendant guilty as accused? The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIME magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?¶ The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.¶ Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.¶ Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.¶ Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### Second is Predictable Limits - The resolution proposes the question the negative is prepared to answer and creates a bounded list of potential affs for us to think about. Debate has unique potential to change attitudes and grow critical thinking skills because it forces pre-round internal deliberation on a of a focused, common ground of debate

Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003,

When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or **the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes**. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, **we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively**.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

#### Third is Dogmatism – Most problems are not black and white but have complex, uncertain interactions. By declaring that whiteness is always bad, they prevent us from understanding the nuances of an incredibly important and complex issue. This is the epitome of dogmatism

Keller, et. al,– Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago - 2001

(Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)

John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28).

The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.

#### Our method solves – Even if the resolution is wrong, having a devil’s advocate in deliberation is vitally important to critical thinking skills and avoiding groupthink

Hugo Mercier and Hélène Landemore- 2011

(Philosophy, Politics and Economics prof @ U of Penn, Poli Sci prof @ Yale), Reasoning is for arguing: Understanding the successes and failures of deliberation, Political Psychology, http://sites.google.com/site/hugomercier/publications

Reasoning can function outside of its normal conditions when it is used purely internally. But it is not enough for reasoning to be done in public to achieve good results. And indeed the problems of individual reasoning highlighted above, such as polarization and overconfidence, can also be found in group reasoning (Janis, 1982; Stasser & Titus, 1985; Sunstein, 2002). Polarization and overconfidence happen because not all group discussion is deliberative. According to some definitions of deliberation, including the one used in this paper, reasoning has to be applied to the same thread of argument *from different opinions* for deliberation to occur. As a consequence, “If the participants are mostly like-minded or hold the same views before they enter into the discussion, they are not situated in the circumstances of deliberation.” (Thompson, 2008: 502). We will presently review evidence showing that the absence or the silencing of dissent is a quasi-necessary condition for polarization or overconfidence to occur in groups. Group polarization has received substantial empirical support. 11 So much support in fact that Sunstein has granted group polarization the status of law (Sunstein, 2002). There is however an important caveat: group polarization will mostly happen when people share an opinion to begin with. In defense of his claim, Sunstein reviews an impressive number of empirical studies showing that many groups tend to form more extreme opinions following discussion. The examples he uses, however, offer as convincing an illustration of group polarization than of the necessity of having group members that share similar beliefs at the outset for polarization to happen (e.g. Sunstein, 2002: 178). Likewise, in his review of the group polarization literature, Baron notes that “The crucial antecedent condition for group polarization to occur is the presence of a likeminded group; i.e. individuals who share a preference for one side of the issue.” (Baron, 2005). Accordingly, when groups do not share an opinion, they tend to depolarize. This has been shown in several experiments in the laboratory (e.g. Kogan & Wallach, 1966; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1978). Likewise, studies of deliberation about political or legal issues report that many groups do not polarize (Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Luskin, Fishkin, & Hahn, 2007; Luskin et al., 2002; Luskin, Iyengar, & Fishkin, 2004; Mendelberg & Karpowitz, 2000). On the contrary, some groups show a homogenization of their attitude (they depolarize) (Luskin et al., 2007; Luskin et al., 2002). The contrasting effect of discussions with a supportive versus dissenting audience is transparent in the results reported by Hansen ( 2003 reported by Fishkin & Luskin, 2005). Participants had been exposed to new information about a political issue. When they discussed it with their family and friends, they learned more facts supporting their initial position. On the other hand, during the deliberative weekend—and the exposition to other opinions that took place—they learned more of the facts supporting the view they disagreed with. The present theory, far from being contradicted by the observation that groups of likeminded people reasoning together tend to polarize, can in fact account straightforwardly for this observation. When people are engaged in a genuine deliberation, the confirmation bias present in each individual’s reasoning is checked, compensated by the confirmation bias of individuals who defend another opinion. When no other opinion is present (or expressed, or listened to), people will be disinclined to use reasoning to critically examine the arguments put forward by other discussants, since they share their opinion. Instead, they will use reasoning to strengthen these arguments or find other arguments supporting the same opinion. In most cases the reasons each individual has for holding the same opinion will be partially non-overlapping. Each participant will then be exposed to new reasons supporting the common opinion, reasons that she is unlikely to criticize. It is then only to be expected that group members should strengthen their support for the common opinion in light of these new arguments. In fact, groups of like-minded people should have little endogenous motivation to start reasoning together: what is the point of arguing with people we agree with? In most cases, such groups are lead to argue because of some external constraint. These constraints can be more or less artificial—a psychologist telling participants to deliberate or a judge asking a jury for a well supported verdict—but they have to be factored in the explanation of the phenomenon. 4. Conclusion: a situational approach to improving reasoning We have argued that reasoning should not be evaluated primarily, if at all, as a device that helps us generate knowledge and make better decisions through private reflection. Reasoning, in fact, does not do those things very well. Instead, we rely on the hypothesis that the function of reasoning is to find and evaluate arguments in deliberative contexts. This evolutionary hypothesis explains why, when reasoning is used in its normal conditions—in a deliberation—it can be expected to lead to better outcomes, consistently allowing deliberating groups to reach epistemically superior outcomes and improve their epistemic status. Moreover, seeing reasoning as an argumentative device also provides a straightforward account of the otherwise puzzling confirmation bias—the tendency to search for arguments that favor our opinion. The confirmation bias, in turn, generates most of the problems people face when they reason in abnormal conditions— when they are not deliberating. This will happen to people who reason alone while failing to entertain other opinions in a private deliberation and to groups in which one opinion is so dominant as to make all others opinions—if they are even present—unable to voice arguments. In both cases, the confirmation bias will go unchecked and create polarization and overconfidence. We believe that the argumentative theory offers a good explanation of the most salient facts about private and public reasoning. This explanation is meant to supplement, rather than replace, existing psychological theories by providing both an answer to the why-questions and a coherent integrative framework for many previously disparate findings. The present article was mostly aimed at comparing deliberative vs. non-deliberative situations, but the theory could also be used to make finer grained predictions within deliberative situations. It is important to stress that the theory used as the backbone for the article is a theory of reasoning. The theory can only make predictions about reasoning, and not about the various other psychological mechanisms that impact the outcome of group discussion. We did not aim at providing a general theory of group processes that could account for all the results in this domain. But it is our contention that the best way to reach this end is by investigating the relevant psychological mechanisms and their interaction. For these reasons, the present article should only be considered a first step towards more fined grained predictions of when and why deliberation is efficient. Turning now to the consequences of the present theory, we can note first that our emphasis on the efficiency of diverse groups sits well with another recent a priori account of group competence. According to Hong and Page’s Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem for example, under certain plausible conditions, a diverse sample of moderately competent individuals will outperform a group of the most competent individuals (Hong & Page, 2004). Specifically, what explains the superiority of some groups of average people over smaller groups of experts is the fact that cognitive diversity (roughly, the ability to interpret the world differently) can be more crucial to group competence than individual ability (Page, 2007). That argument has been carried over from groups of problem-solvers in business and practical matters to democratically deliberating groups in politics (e.g., Anderson, 2006; Author, 2007, In press). At the practical level, the present theory potentially has important implications. Given that individual reasoning works best when confronted to different opinions, the present theory supports the improvement of the presence or expression of dissenting opinions in deliberative settings. Evidently, many people, in the field of deliberative democracy or elsewhere, are also advocating such changes. While these common sense suggestions have been made in the past (e.g., Bohman,

2007; Sunstein, 2003, 2006), the present theory provides additional arguments for them. It also explains why approaches focusing on individual rather than collective reasoning are not likely to be successful. Specifically tailored practical suggestions can also be made by using departures from the normal conditions of reasoning as diagnostic tools. Thus, different departures will entail different solutions. Accountability—having to defends one’s opinion in front of an audience—can be used to bring individual reasoners closer to a situation of private deliberation. The use of different aggregation mechanisms could help identify the risk of deliberation among like-minded people. For example, before a group launches a discussion, a preliminary vote or poll could establish the extent to which different opinions are represented. If this procedure shows that people agree on the issue at hand, then skipping the discussion may save the group some efforts and reduce the risk of polarization. Alternatively, a **devil’s advocate** could be introduced in the group to defend an alternative opinion (e.g. Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986).

#### Fourth is Policy Education

#### A focus on policy is necessary to learn the pragmatic details of powerful institutions – acting without this knowledge is doomed to fail in the face of policy professionals who make the decisions that actually affect outcomes

McClean, Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at Molloy College in New York, 2001

(David E., “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope”, Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, http://www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/)

Or we might take Foucault who, at best, has provided us with what may reasonably be described as a very long and eccentric footnote to Nietzsche (I have once been accused, by a Foucaltian true believer, of "gelding" Foucault with other similar remarks). Foucault, who has provided the Left of the late 1960s through the present with such notions as "governmentality," "Limit," "archeology," "discourse" "power" and "ethics," creating or redefining their meanings, has made it overabundantly clear that all of our moralities and practices are the successors of previous ones which derive from certain configurations of savoir and connaisance arising from or created by, respectively, the discourses of the various scientific schools. But I have not yet found in anything Foucault wrote or said how such observations may be translated into a political movement or hammered into a political document or theory (let alone public policies) that can be justified or founded on more than an arbitrary aesthetic experimentalism. In fact, Foucault would have shuddered if any one ever did, since he thought that anything as grand as a movement went far beyond what he thought appropriate. This leads me to mildly rehabilitate Habermas, for at least he has been useful in exposing Foucault's shortcomings in this regard, just as he has been useful in exposing the shortcomings of others enamored with the abstractions of various Marxian-Freudian social critiques. Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

#### The only way to reform the energy system is for critical scholars to learn the technical language and bureaucratic regulations of energy policy – essential to address growing environmental and geopolitical challenges of energy policy

Loren Lutzenhiser – assistant professor of sociology @ Washington State University – 1994, Energy and Interdisciplinary Environmental Science, The American Sociologist, Vol. 25, No. 1, Natural Resources and the Environment andSociology (Spring, 1994), pp. 58-79, jstor

Why is the Sociology of Energy Important to Environmental Policy and Research? Despite these limitations, other disciplines generally offer weaker accounts of the human role in energy production and consumption. In fact, efforts by physics, engineering and economics derived from the study of macro-level processes often mislead analysis by misrepresenting the micro-level social processes that control energy flows and shape socioenvironmental systems—processes about which sociology has a good deal to say (Lutzenhiser, 1993). Although the efficiency of energy use has improved in the United States over the past 20 years—reversing a centuries-long trend of increasing energy consumption (Morrison, 1992), neither market nor policy interventions have been particularly successful in reducing energy flows to anywhere near the theoretical minima that energy analysts estimate can maintain quality of life (Cherfas, 1991). One important contribution of sociology, then, lies in its ability to investigate the micro-social processes that promote consumption and constrain changes in efficiency—a value repeatedly stressed by social scientists and sympathetic analysts working in and around the energy system (Farhar, 1991; Schipper, 1991; Lovins, 1992; Lutzenhiser, 1992a; Stern, 1986,1992a). It is also clear that macro-social processes involving the geopolitics of energy, global energy system-based pollution, and the energy technology dependencies of advanced societies will grow in importance in coming decades. A few relevant sociological analyses in this area have recently appeared (e.g., Dunlap, Kraft and Rosa, 1993, Hackett and Lutzenhiser, 1991, Lutzenhiser and Hackett, 1993, Short and Clark, 1992) as have sociological contributions concerning global environmental change (e.g., see B?ttel and Taylor, 1992; Schnaiberg, 1991; Dunlap, Lutzenhiser and Rosa, 1994; and Dunlap, Gallup and Gallup, 1993). But this literature represents a very small part of a rapidly growing body of research on large-scale environmental processes and problems—many rooted in the energy system. If sociology is so relevant, why does it play such a minor part? Because the discipline has defined the analysis of the energy and environmental bases of society as marginal to the sociological enterprise, and because the perspectives and projects of the environmental sciences have effectively marginalized the social in their analyses. External Constraints: Nonsocial Models Dominate, Marginalizing Sociological Perspectives Nonsocial disciplines have historical precedence in energy analysis, having defined the field and organized large-scale, energy-environment research pro grams before sociology arrived on the scene in the 1970s. The dominance of these disciplines, and their continued containment of the social is accomplished through distinctly nonsocial paradigms and a complex of institutional supports. In this section, I review the most widely used energy-environment models, and examine the ways in which their focus upon technical, economic and environmental variables overlooks and distorts macro-social processes and micro-social behav iors.9 I discuss their limits and empirical failures, as well as efforts to bring social institutions and human agency into energy-environment analysis. This is most often accomplished via the economic and psychological models preferred by natural scientists and engineers?although such amendments have their own empirical problems. Sociological improvements to existing paradigms are also discussed, along with several multidisciplinary approaches that seem to offer avenues of cooperation between the social and technical sciences. Global Ecologies: Big Nature and Little Humans At the most macroscopic level, energy-environment analysis involves models that are earth-focussed and nature-based. They concern geological (plate tec tonic, volcanism), biological (photosynthesis, ecosystem dynamics), and climatic processes (atmosphere-ocean interactions). The fundamental focus of analysis is change in large nonhuman systems, often over long time intervals (NAS, 1990). For example, one important model of the earth system focuses on the carbo? cycle ?a phenomenon that involves the interaction of geological, biological and cli matic processes and is of considerable importance in evaluating the consequences of global warming caused by increased carbon dioxide (C02) levels in the at mosphere. Treating global carbon flow as an input-output problem, a "sources and sinks" model (NAS 1991) can be used to inventory the release of carbon into the atmosphere (primarily from natural sources) and its subsequent removal (prima rily through the natural "sequestering" of carbon in sinks such as plant and animal bodies, tropical forests and ocean plankton). Human carbon releases (from industrial combustion, power plants, forest burning, etc.) are of crucial concern, but these are generally small in comparison to the volume of the atmosphere itself and the scale of naturally occurring contributions and withdrawals.10 Human atmospheric contributions work at the margins of large natural systems?which is one of the reasons that some controversy surrounds the importance of human effects on global warming. In "sources and sinks" and other global-scale environ mental models, human action does its work by amplifying and dampening the effects of larger natural processes. And despite the natural science consensus that these "anthropogenic" sources of environmental change are of the most serious sort, the bulk of scientific interest, funding and action is in the study of natural systems. In global warming research, for example, efforts are underway to produce more sophisticated models of the natural workings of the carbon cycle?earth system simulations that will employ several generations of natural scientists and engineers and will require the development of new generations of super com Lutzenhiser 63 ?ters (Kerr, 1990). In the natural science community, there is little interest in launching investigations of the human role in the energy-environment dynamic on anywhere near that scale. Even among those environmental advocates who have been historically most concerned about human effects on the earth system (e.g., Barry Commoner, Paul Ehrlich, Lester Brown), human action is painted in broad strokes and stereotyped in concepts such as "affluence," "consumerism," "technology," and "population"?obviously important clusters of variables and ones that are familiar to sociologists (Dunlap, Lutzenhiser and Rosa, 1994), but underdeveloped and in need of considerable elaboration before they can use fully contribute to debates about environmental change. While we should applaud the calls to action in response to anthropogenic change that are now emanating from the natural science community, it is clear that the participation of the social sciences has been minimal in their deliberations. The social sciences certainly bear some of the responsibility for this situation (discussed below), but they have hardly single-handedly created the institutionalized status ordering of the sciences. A quick reading of the list of 320 "prominent signatories to the world scientists' warning to humanity" (Union of Concerned Scientists, 1993) finds only seven social scientists?five economists and two geographers. Regional Models: Bringing Machines Into Natural Systems At subglobal geographies, a clearer focus on societal factors might be expected. The pollution and resource consumption impacts of industrial production, power generation, transportation systems, and dispersed energy use are most visible, for example, at the regional (nation, province or state, bioregion, watershed) scale, where human causes of environmental change can readily be seen to derive from the operations of complex sociotechnical systems. This is a topic about which sociology should have a good deal to say. But sociological models have not been applied in the environmental analysis of regional systems, while a number of engineering-based approaches have. An intriguing "industrial me tabolism" metaphor (Ayers, 1989), for example, is promoted by the National Academy of Engineering (NAE, 1989) as a device for depicting the flows of energy and materials within ecosystems. The model also illustrates the facility with which the social can be excluded through selective focus on the technical elements of regional systems. The "industrial organism" invoked in the model turns out to be composed entirely of technical elements (hardware, energy, materials, pollutants) and its "metabolism" interacts with the environment in ways that do not explicitly involve human control or consumption. When used as a descriptive tool for material flow accounting, the model clearly does useful work (Stigliani and Anderberg, 1991)- And recent discussions of regional "indus trial ecologies" do make reference to organizational learning, institutional con straints, culture and values (Thomas Dietz, personal communication, 1993). But, to date, these discussions seem to have done little to integrate the efforts of students of technology, environment and society in the analysis of regional systems. ergy Plows: Abstract Relations and Aggregate Effects Other models of society-environment dynamics focus more narrowly on en ergy flows. Most tend to operate at large geographical (societal or regional) scales, at which production, consumption, energy losses, and pollution, are analyzed in aggregate and abstract terms. For example, those models may focus on the relative energy contributions of various fuels (coal, petroleum, natural gas), on conversion technologies (hydro, thermal and nuclear electric generation), or on consumption in various (industrial, commercial, transportation, residential) "sec tors" of the society (e.g., see U.S. Department of Energy, 1993). Here too, the social role in consumption and the social organization of energy production, are subsumed and lost in aggregate flows of energy as it passes through various phases of conversion and distribution. Some systematic efforts have been made to better account for the shape of the present system and to predict future system changes (e.g, in fuels mix, technologies and consumption levels). These are embodied in various govern ment, corporate and academic policy models that take into account prices and changing energy supplies in predicting energy use. In these models, however, social processes of technical innovation and consumption behavior are seen as determined wholly by changing energy costs?which are believed to be set rather mechanically by markets for limited fuels (Starr, 1992). All social relations in these models are macro-economic, and human actions required to maintain or change the energy system are assumed to derive from the economic motivations of individuals and firms. The more likely socioeconomic relations of modern societies (Granovetter, 1985; Etzioni, 1988, 1991) and the effects of noneconomic influences on technology development, fuel choice, and consumption patterns, are definitionally excluded from consideration. Understanding Energy Use: Focus on Hardware Variables and Human Constants Some energy analyses also focus more narrowly on trends in energy use and pollution?a side of the system that involves fairly obvious social influences on production and consumption. Complex models of changing energy demand? that specify in detail various end-uses of energy?are widely used by energy regulatory agencies and utility companies (CEC, 1991; DOE, 1990). They too manage to sharply limit consideration of the social. In their "disaggregation" of household energy consumption, for example, these models additively combine estimates of "typical" energy flows through water heaters, furnaces, refrigera tors, televisions, stoves, washers, dryers, etc., to build up a picture of the total energy demanded by "stocks" of housing. Human occupants are subsumed by the built environment, their variable social behavior being embedded in the consumption averages assigned to various types of machines and houses. The basic unit in the analysis of human-object "artifact ensembles" (Bijker, 1993) is taken to be the physical object, while human behaviors required to activate objects and induce energy flows are assumed to be homogeneous. These models make the absurdly simple assumption that all humans are alike?an assumption challenged by a number of empirical studies that suggest that energy use behavior and consumption via appliances and buildings is actually highly variable and socially structured (Lutzenhiser, 1993). To date, however, this evidence has had little effect upon the specification or use of these policy models. Highly detailed models of this sort have also been developed to study "build ing performance" (e.g., the U.S. Department of Energy's DOE2 model, developed by Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory). These models provide micro-physical simula tions of the interactions of single buildings and their environments. Here too, human occupants have a ghostly status, being embedded in average appliance consumption estimates and perhaps, in a very detailed modelling, contributing heat to the system from metabolism and their use of small appliances and lighting. Humans are only physical objects in these micro-modelling efforts, although, to the extent possible, actors and action are banned from both simulated and ex perimental research on "building" energy use. Having eliminated social action, these models, despite their physical detail, do not fare well in empirical tests (Vine, et al., 1982).11 In forecasting the future, both housing stock and building-based models use engineering assumptions about likely changes in technology, along with esti mates of population growth and future energy prices, to estimate the changing energy use patterns from which further estimates of pollution and environmental impacts may be derived. Such models are widely used as guides for policy and regulation. The only social science influence in these efforts is from neoclassical economics; for example, in assumptions that choices to produce more efficient technologies or buildings and the decisions of consumers to purchase them are determined by self-interested economic calculation. Limited Efforts to Bring People Back In If energy flows were determined exclusively by weather, buildings and ma chines, and if societal-level energy and environmental impacts could be accurately predicted in aggregate terms, then sociologists would have little quarrel with these models. We might like them to be more fully specified, since human groups, after all, control hardware, respond to the weather, and take action in the face of price changes. But more than disciplinary turf or theoretical symmetry is at stake. Not only do these models not perform well empirically, but there is substantial evidence that their errors can be traced directly to their failure to consider human behavior. Although social action has been paradigmatically excluded from energy analy sis except at the margins, a good deal of social science has been done at those margins?and the literature is fairly accessible to energy analysts. For example, studies of energy-using behavior and of empirical variations in energy use, as well as thoughtful critiques of the "energy user as rational economic actor" formulation, have been offered.12 Social psychologists and cognitive anthro pologists have been the strongest critics of economism and rationalism in this literature?arguing that actors' understandings (of energy, technology and available choice) differ considerably from engineering understandings of these matters, and that lay economic calculations are not, in reality, made as assumed by economists (Kempton and Montgomery, 1982; Kempton and Layne, 1988; Archer, et al., 1984; Stern, 1986). Alternative attitudes based psychological models (e.g., of consumer willing ness to make energy conserving changes in behavior and technology) have not performed well, however, with attitudes proving to be weak predictors of en ergy action (Olsen, 1981; Ester, 1985). Attempts to amend attitude models by considering "context factors" (e.g., price, weather and available technology? the stuff of physical models) have been more successful (Black, Stern and Elworth, 1985), leading to a call for the fundamental revision of psychological models to incorporate a wider range of social and physical context variables (Stern and Oskamp, 1987). An important weakness in this work lies in the fact that, as in economic formulations, the individual actor (albeit under the influence of social others) is the basic unit of analysis. While a focus on the individual has provided insights into choice, values and commitments as these bear on consumption and ulti mately upon environmental pollution, it also obscures the actions of social groups? families, households, kin networks, neighborhoods, communities, organizations, and cultures?and their consumption and conservation of energy. A focus on groups is not simply a plea for more sociologically oriented analysis. It also represents a call for a more human-ecological focus, following from the observations that social groups construct and occupy buildings, that economic choice and technology use are socially constrained and culturally accomplished and that collectively constructed lifestyles are fundamental in the patterning of consumption. Sociological work undertaken from this perspective has shown clear associations between social structure, energy use and pollution (Dillman, Rosa and Dillman, 1983; Lutzenhiser and Hackett, 1993). There are some indications of convergence between physical-technical, eco nomic, psychological and sociocultural models?since all offer selective but useful views of the ecology of energy-environment systems. A few efforts have been made, for example, to design and test mixed models (Cramer, 1985; Parti, Sebald and Won, 1986; Lutzenhiser and Hackett, 1993). But physical/economic models clearly predominate and their partisans show few signs of publicly acknowledg ing their weaknesses or expanding the range of variables taken into account (Lutzenhiser, 1992b). Calls for rapproachment have come from sociologists working within the energy research and policy establishment (Farhar, 1991) and efforts to bring social science theory and research to bear on large-scale environmental problems have proposed that energy studies be used as a model for other in terdisciplinary collaborations (Stern, 1992b). But to date these have had little discernible effect. Accommodation in Environmental Analysis: Human "Driving Forces" A well-supported "second environmental science" could indeed promote needed interdisciplinary and cross-paradigmatic research. But even so, it might lack the theoretical coherence desirable in a science of society-environment relations. One such theoretical orientation has been proposed by the National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council panel on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change (NAS, 1992)?itself an interdisciplinary group. The panel was charged with inventorying knowledge of human-environment interactions and, although it reviewed a wide range of scholarship in environmental sociol ogy, only one sociologist served as a panel member. Rather than explicitly adopting a human-ecological or environmental sociological framework, the panel opted to classify human causes of environmental change in five broad categories of "driv ing forces," calling for studies of their collective environmental effects.13 These "forces" (". . . a complex of social, political, economic, technological and cul tural variables. . ." [NAS, 1992, p. 75]) include: population change, economic growth, technological change, political-economic institutions, and attitudes and beliefs. One can hardly dispute the relevance of any item on the list, but in combining dissimilar elements (i.e., psychological states, population trends and social institutions) the model seems more a loosely coupled collection of per spectives than a theoretical synthesis. This is hardly a fatal flaw in what is fundamentally a research agenda (in the construction of which the panel showed considerable breadth of vision). This sort of compromise theorizing is probably inevitable when "... attempting to convince social scientists why energy and environment are important and bio logical and physical scientists why social science has something to say" (Thomas Dietz, personal communication, 1993); and, it must be said that the driving forces model is fairly congenial with socioecological perspectives (Dunlap, Lutzenhiser and Rosa, 1994). But it should concern sociologists who are inter ested in a theoretical integration of the social, technical and ecological that the model awkwardly couples disembodied sociopolitical institutions and neoclassi cal economic markets with consumers (as psychological individuals), whose nature is rather uncritically taken to be pan-culturally acquisitive. Toward a Sociological Model A more fully social account would, for example, point to the fact that energy technology-environment systems may have more coherence than the driving forces model implies?being socially structured at the macro level and cultur ally generated at the micro level. The relative importance of micro and macro processes and their interrelations in the ecology of industrial societies are not well understood, and represent important areas for research?e.g., concerning the degree to which "demand" can possibly be autonomous of supply (Schnaiberg, 1991). Production priorities and their environmental impacts are certainly shaped by political economy, while consumption is importantly constituted in moral (cultural) action. A more sociological research program would frame the human dimensions of environmental change as a problem involving, for example, the behavior of organizational systems (fields, sets, networks, industries), and their interactions with class, race, gender, and consumption cultures. This approach would yield a critical whole-system model, while more limited physical, economic and psychological models of human-energy-environment systems take on a narrow focus and consensual tone that necessarily embody system maintenance interests. Competition and conflict are treated as exogenous in conventional models because they are not designed for human-environment system analysis, but are intended more to be used by competing social interests to generate particular images of the world in order to secute particular outcomes. The broader socialanalytic frame takes these models and their modellers, along with the social/ political relations in which they are embedded, as themselves integral elements of the sociotechnical systems implicated in environmental change. Institutional Context: The Energy Establishment and Limitations of Academic Sociology The Power and Insularity of the Energy System The institutional milieu that supports narrow and asocial definitions of the energy-environment problem is one dominated by large energy firms, an elaborate regulatory complex, and a highly scientized policy process. This is particularly true in the case of costly and hazardous energy technologies (e.g., nuclear fis sion, fusion, and radioactive waste disposal). The energy system is interwoven with a dense web of regulations, laws, engineering standards, and bureaucratic procedures, all of which are encoded in the same physical and economistic terms used in energy research. Taken together, they embody a paradigm concretized in technical language and legal instruments with strong inertial qualities. The paradigm derives from specialized academic disciplines, which are closely related to the energy system. These include energy economics, electrical, chemical, mechanical, civil, and environmental engineering, systems analysis and operations research. A network of corporate and university-based national laboratories conduct federally sponsored research guided by the physical-economic paradigm, and a number of specialized energy associations and energy-related branches of scientific societies regularly hold professional meetings, publish journals, and sponsor special conferences that support the paradigm. Some of these groups are even empowered to set formal standards for engineering and architectural designs. A wide array of consulting firms, specializing in paradigm-supporting training and evaluation, also operate in the orbits of energy firms, state agencies and the national laboratories. Social scientists hold a tiny fraction of the professional positions in the energy system, and their influence is sharply circumscribed. The sociological study of the energy system's self-understandings, paradigmatic limitations, environmental constructions, and difficulties in communicating across system boundaries offer numerous opportunities to extend sociologial theories of organizational change and the evolution of large-scale social sys tems – e.g., along the lines indicated by Stinchcombe (1990) and Luhmann (1989). It is also an area rich in possibilities for the newly expanding sociologies of technology, innovation and technical occupations. For example, studies of the evolution of the system as it faces serious environmental problems related to nuclear power and radioactive waste, fossil fuel depletion, alternative energy sources, and energy-efficiency can contribute insights to a number of areas of environmental sociology. In fact, the relative lack of sociological work in the area would also seem to make actors in the energy system potentially important consumers of social science research. The Disciplinary Limitations of Sociology But the energy system has been far from solicitous of sociological views, and sociology has been surprisingly reticent about energy studies. A call to arms by one of the discipline's most influential observers—Duncan (1978) in "Sociologists Should Reconsider Nuclear Energy"—was virtually ignored. While sociologists enjoyed funding and produced a number of useful energy studies at the height of the energy crisis, they shifted their attention elsewhere as energy prices fell. Opportunism? Not entirely. These researchers often fondly recall the interdisciplinary projects in which they were involved. Factors internal to the discipline played a significant role in this shift, including the low status of interdisciplinary publication, and the loss of legitimacy that followed from loss of funding. The disciplinary costs of pursuing interdisciplinary interests continue to be high. A steep learning curve is involved in such work, since at least some technical knowledge must be acquired for even modest studies of energy-environment systems. As an illustration, the social historian Thomas Hughes (1983), for example, found that without an understanding of the importance of "load factor" (a measure of system utilization) among early electrical system builders, he could not adequately account for the particular ways in which late, nineteenth-century electrical utilities engineered their expansions. Whether the object of inquiry might be the macro-political economy of nuclear power plant siting, or the micro-social relations of engineering design groups, a time-consuming mastery of technical vocabularies is required. Gaining the necessary scientific and technical background is hardly an insurmountable task (science writers do it, more and less well, all the time). But even so, a significant investment in an unfamiliar field is required, since this knowledge is rarely gained incidentally by sociologists. Our formal associations and informal orbits on campus tend to be segregated from those of natural scientists and engineers, and few efforts are generally made on either side to exchange views. Economists seem more willing to acquire at least a first approximation of other discipline's theories and then search for ways to bring economic models to bear on the problems that they find there. This segregation is mirrored in the directorate structure of the National Science Foundation, the division of labor among private foundations, and the organizational makeup of multidisciplinary scientific associations. As a result, institutions with social science capabilities are generally disconnected from those with environmental responsibility (NAS, 1992). The unwillingness to venture into unfamiliar territory is strong even when boundary-spanning projects are undertaken. For example, efforts to stimulate interdisciplinary socioenvironmental research through NSF's Human Dimensions of Global Change (HDGC) program—a three year-old initiative whose funding is equal to that of the entire NSF sociology program—have been met with little interest from sociology. Just as natural science approaches tend to exclude human behavior, so too do sociological perspectives tend to exclude the physical and environmental from their accounts of social change. Contemporary sociologists concerned with environment and technology continue a long struggle with an intellectual division of labor that has narrowly circumscribed the theoretical domain of the social. As Catton and Dunlap (1980) point out, the problem derives from efforts to carve out a unique subject matter for sociology?—a process that has resulted in core conceptions that miscast social action as somehow disconnected from the physical and natural systems within which action is necessarily embedded, and toward which action routinely refers. And just as traditional sociological self-understandings are uneasy with "technical" and "biological" topics, we can now add emergent interpretivist perspectives that see natural environments largely as social-constructions—nature as a potentially important social variable risks becoming mere nature as socially variable.14 The general lack of familiarity with the sociological relevance of energy-environment research is clearly reflected in disciplinary publication patterns. While opportunities to publish energy-related research in sociology journals certainly exist, they are finite and limited by both real and perceived audiences for the work. As a result, only a small number of energy-related papers have appeared in the sociological literature during the past 20 years, with very few in first-tier journals. Publishing opportunities in refereed energy and environmental journals are somewhat more numerous—and, in fact, work reported there is more likely to influence research and policy in those fields than are papers published in sociology journals. Publications in energy and environmental literatures are difficult for sociologists to access and evaluate, however, and tendencies toward parochialism can result in a devaluation of work published outside of sociology. As a practical matter, the active engagement of sociologists within environmental and technical domains is—perhaps unintendedly—discouraged, and one concrete result is that the generation of sociologists who pioneered sociological energy studies is rapidly thinning. The failure to sustain a critical mass of energy sociologists is due partly to historical coincidence. As the energy crisis disappeared from center stage and the turn to market forces was made, funding for research groups declined and the opportunity for academic influence in the energy system passed. The discipline still had a contribution to make, but sociologists concerned about tenure and promotion did not persist since, in the words of one informant "... it was clear that the discipline wasn't interested and we needed to worry about review." Those who were able to find positions within the energy system have, over time, had some influence on policy. But it is little wonder that graduate students who might otherwise be interested in the area recognize the stigma associated with anything that can be cast as "applied" research, and steer a prudent course away from interdisciplinary specialities. The result is a sharply limited lack of sociological human resources that might be deployed in energy-environment studies—despite the expressed needs and desires of concerned natural scientists and environmental advocates. Although the market may be changing in modest ways, few sociology departments have actively recruited faculty in the areas of environment and technology. Few Ph.D. programs have offered training in these areas, and only a handful of land-grant institutions have developed strong research and teaching programs in environmental sociology. The NAS panel on the Human Dimensions of Environmental Change considered in some detail these and other institutional limitations to basic research on human-environment interactions. They concluded that existing disciplinary reward structures were unlikely to support the needed expansion of environmental social science training and research, and recommended that special efforts be made by the NSF and other federal science agencies to target fellowships and research funding in support of the effort (NAS, 1992, pp. 223-234). Disciplinary Agendas in Research, Training and Institution Building The promotion of such policies and the use of their benefits, to an important degree, depends upon the initiative of the discipline. If it is desirable to more aggressively cultivate sociological studies of energy and the environment—and I think that it clearly is for both theoretical and societal reasons—then it is necessary to open up otherwise closed environmental, technical and social paradigms to better secure legitimacy in all quarters for this sort of work. Simply negotiating access for sociologists to multidisciplinary teams offers no guarantee of legitimacy, however, either with the collaborators or with mainstream sociology. Social perspectives are regularly accorded only token status in multi disciplinary projects—a good example might be international development work. Multidisciplinary funding programs often limit the social sciences to small "high risk" projects, and social science graduate students are often disadvantaged in fellowships with applicants from the natural sciences and economics.

#### Forcing specific policy analysis is key – allows state institutions to be reclaimed and generates debater education necessary to create a left governmentality – necessary to create a public sphere

Ferguson, Professor of Anthropology at Stanford, 11

(The Uses of Neoliberalism, Antipode, Vol. 41, No. S1, pp 166–184)

If we are seeking, as this special issue of Antipode aspires to do, to link our critical analyses to the world of grounded political struggle—not only to interpret the world in various ways, but also to change it—then there is much to be said for focusing, as I have here, on mundane, real- world debates around policy and politics, even if doing so inevitably puts us on the compromised and reformist terrain of the possible, rather than the seductive high ground of revolutionary ideals and utopian desires. But I would also insist that there is more at stake in the examples I have discussed here than simply a slightly better way to ameliorate the miseries of the chronically poor, or a technically superior method for relieving the suffering of famine victims.¶ My point in discussing the South African BIG campaign, for instance, is not really to argue for its implementation. There is much in the campaign that is appealing, to be sure. But one can just as easily identify a series of worries that would bring the whole proposal into doubt. Does not, for instance, the decoupling of the question of assistance from the issue of labor, and the associated valorization of the “informal”, help provide a kind of alibi for the failures of the South African regime to pursue policies that would do more to create jobs? Would not the creation of a basic income benefit tied to national citizenship simply exacerbate the vicious xenophobia that already divides the South African poor,¶ in a context where many of the poorest are not citizens, and would thus not be eligible for the BIG? Perhaps even more fundamentally, is the idea of basic income really capable of commanding the mass support that alone could make it a central pillar of a new approach to distribution? The record to date gives powerful reasons to doubt it. So far, the technocrats’ dreams of relieving poverty through efficient cash transfers have attracted little support from actual poor people, who seem to find that vision a bit pale and washed out, compared with the vivid (if vague) populist promises of jobs and personalistic social inclusion long offered by the ANC patronage machine, and lately personified by Jacob Zuma (Ferguson forthcoming).¶ My real interest in the policy proposals discussed here, in fact, has little to do with the narrow policy questions to which they seek to provide answers. For what is most significant, for my purposes, is not whether or not these are good policies, but the way that they illustrate a process through which specific governmental devices and modes of reasoning that we have become used to associating with a very particular (and conservative) political agenda (“neoliberalism”) may be in the process of being peeled away from that agenda, and put to very different uses. Any progressive who takes seriously the challenge I pointed to at the start of this essay, the challenge of developing new progressive arts of government, ought to find this turn of events of considerable interest.¶ As Steven Collier (2005) has recently pointed out, it is important to question the assumption that there is, or must be, a neat or automatic fit between a hegemonic “neoliberal” political-economic project (however that might be characterized), on the one hand, and specific “neoliberal” techniques, on the other. Close attention to particular techniques (such as the use of quantitative calculation, free choice, and price driven by supply and demand) in particular settings (in Collier’s case, fiscal and budgetary reform in post-Soviet Russia) shows that the relationship between the technical and the political-economic “is much more polymorphous and unstable than is assumed in much critical geographical work”, and that neoliberal technical mechanisms are in fact “deployed in relation to diverse political projects and social norms” (2005:2).¶ As I suggested in referencing the role of statistics and techniques for pooling risk in the creation of social democratic welfare states, social technologies need not have any essential or eternal loyalty to the political formations within which they were first developed. Insurance rationality at the end of the nineteenth century had no essential vocation to provide security and solidarity to the working class; it was turned to that purpose (in some substantial measure) because it was available, in the right place at the right time, to be appropriated for that use. Specific ways of solving or posing governmental problems, specific institutional and intellectual mechanisms, can be combined in an almost infinite variety of ways, to accomplish different social ends. With social, as with any other sort of technology, it is not the machines or the mechanisms that decide what they will be used to do.¶ Foucault (2008:94) concluded his discussion of socialist government- ality by insisting that the answers to the Left’s governmental problems require not yet another search through our sacred texts, but a process of conceptual and institutional innovation. “[I]f there is a really socialist governmentality, then it is not hidden within socialism and its texts. It cannot be deduced from them. It must be invented”. But invention in the domain of governmental technique is rarely something worked up out of whole cloth. More often, it involves a kind of bricolage (Le ́vi- Strauss 1966), a piecing together of something new out of scavenged parts originally intended for some other purpose. As we pursue such a process of improvisatory invention, we might begin by making an inventory of the parts available for such tinkering, keeping all the while an open mind about how different mechanisms might be put to work, and what kinds of purposes they might serve. If we can go beyond seeing in “neoliberalism” an evil essence or an automatic unity, and instead learn to see a field of specific governmental techniques, we may be surprised to find that some of them can be repurposed, and put to work in the service of political projects very different from those usually associated with that word. If so, we may find that the cabinet of governmental arts available to us is a bit less bare than first appeared, and that some rather useful little mechanisms may be nearer to hand than we thought.

### 1NC 2

#### Next off is the K

#### Their framework for debate is mired in totalitarian ideology—the privileging of “oppressed” voices over and against that of “oppressors” buys into a dangerously homogenizing world view which authorizes genocidal violence against all world views that are not sufficiently “liberatory.”

Gur-Ze’ev 98 (Ilan, Education—Haifa University, 1998 “Toward a Non-Repressive Critical Pedagogy,” http://construct.haifa.ac.il/~ilangz/Critpe39.html)

Freire’s Critical Pedagogy did not grow out of mere principles but out of his direct involvement with Brazil’s poor farmers. He saw that their social and economic subservice and their lack of a “voice” and of competence to conceive reality critically and comprehensibly could not be separated from their inability to act correctly for change in their reality. In his second stage of development, Giroux made much use of Freire’s emphasis on communality, collective knowledge, and counter-education, which aims to challenge the silencing hegemonic education. Such an education guarantees the weakness and the silence of marginalized groups even when they comprise the majority of the population. Note that unlike Giroux, Freire still formulates his Critical Pedagogy in modernistic categories of class struggle. The postmodern and the multicultural discourses that influenced Giroux took a one-dimensional attitude towards power. They denoted the importance of deconstructing cultural reproduction and the centrality of relations of dominance to the “voices” of groups whose collective memory, knowledge, and identity were threatened or manipulated by power relations and knowledge conceptions that reflect and serve the hegemonic groups. Freire is not aware that this manipulation has two sides, negative and a positive. The negative side allows the realization of violence by guaranteeing possibilities for the successful functioning of a normalized human being and creating possibilities for men and women to become more productive in “their” realm of self-evidence. Their normality reflects and serves this self-evidence by partly constituting the human subject as well as the thinking self. Giroux easily extracted from Freire’s Critical Pedagogy the elements denoting the importance of acknowledging and respecting the knowledge and identity of marginalized groups and individuals. In fact, this orientation and its telos are in contrast to the central concepts of postmodern educators on the one hand and Critical Theories of Adorno, Horkheimer, and even Habermas on the other. But many similar conceptions and attitudes are present as well. The aim of Freire’s Critical Pedagogy is to restore to marginalized groups their stolen “voice”, to enable them to recognize identity, and give their name the things in the world. The similarity to postmodern critiques is already evident in his acknowledgment that to correctly coin a word is nothing less than to change the world.(10) However, to identify this conception with the postmodern stand is a over-hasty because the centrality of language in Freire‘s thought relates to his concept of “truth” and a class struggle that will allow the marginalized and repressed an authentic “voice”,(11) as if their self-evident knowledge is less false than that which their oppressors hold as valid. Implicitly, Freire contends that the interests of all oppressed people are the same, and that one general theory exists for deciphering repressive reality and for developing the potentials absorbed in their collective memory. An alternative critique of language which does not claim to empower the marginalized and the controlled to conceive and articulate their knowledge and needs on the one hand, and is not devoted to their emancipation on the other, is mere “verbalism”, according to Freire.(12) The purpose or common cause of the educator and the educated, the leader and the followers, in a dialogue between equal partners is called here “praxis”. Praxis in education aims to bridge the gap between theory and transformational action that effectively transforms human existence. This concept of transformation contrasts with educational concept of Critical Theory. Here learning and education are basically the individual’s responsibility and possibility, and are always an ontological issue while epistemologically concretized in the given historical social context. They are conditioned by an individual’s competence to transcend the “father image”, prejudices, habits, and external power relations that constitute the collective in order to attain full personal and human growth.(10) According to Freire, this personal development is conditioned by critical acknowledgment and should occur as part of the entire community’s revolutionary practice. Only there can successful educational praxis realize its dialogical essence. The dialogue is an authentic encounter between one person and another, an educator and her/his fellow who wants to be dialogically educated, and the encounter should be erotic or not realized at all. “Love” is presented as the center andn the essence of dialogue.(14) Freire’s Critical Pedagogy is foundationalist and positivist, in contrast to his explicit negation of this orientation. It is a synthesis between dogmatic idealism and vulgar collectivism meant to sound the authentic voice of the collective, within which the dialogue is supposed to become aware of itself and of the world. The educational links of this synthesis contain a tension between its mystic-terroristic and its reflective-emancipatory dimensions. In Freire’s attitude towards Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, the terroristic potential contained in the mystic conception of the emancipated “group”, “people”, or “class” knowledge is revealed within the concept of a dialogue. Freire introduces Che Guevara as an ideal model for anti-violent dialogue between partners in the desirable praxis. Che Guevara used a structurally similar rhetoric to that of Ernst Juenger and National Socialist ideologues on the creative power of war, blood, and sweat in the constitution of a new man, the real “proletar” in South America. Freire gives this as an example of the liberation of the oppressed within the framework of new “love” relations which allow to speak the silenced “voice”.(15) His uncritical understanding of power/knowledge relations draws him to observe the de-colonization process in Africa and elsewhere (undoubtedly a progressive development in itself) as suitable contexts for national realization of Critical Pedagogy.(16) This is not mere naivity but a readjustment of the terroristic element of his Critical Pedagogy revealed earlier in his understanding of “Che” as an educator in his alliance with the national systematic oppression of “liberated” Third World countries. I do not claim that there is no need to support local struggles for democracy, equality, and developmenting such countries or that it is impossible for them to be regarded as inferior or undemocratic in principle. My claim does not refer even to a specific country, since it is possible that in some cases a Third World country will develop a flourishing democracy. However, for historical reasons, such as Western imperialism, local power structures, cultural traditions, and conceptual apparatuses, Western-style democracy is not likely to be realized in most of them. My argument refers to Freire’s failure in the crucial theoretical and political element of the concept of dialogue and the relation between knowledge and power, consciousness and violence, as presented by Hegel, Marx, Adorno, and Foucault. That is why his emancipatory Eros sides implicitly with the anti-critical tradition of dogmatic revolutionary Christianity and voluntaristic revolutionary models of the anarchists, National Socialism, and South America’s guerrillas. These are contrasted with the explicit devotion of his Critical Pedagogy to dialogue, non-functionalist Critical Thinking, as well as spiritual maturity. Like the Frankfurt School’s Critical Theory, Freire’s project is also indebted to the negation of present reality. However, from the totality of reality and its power games it attempts to expropriate knowledge of repressive groups as possesing special validity; from the totality governed by power to save a certain “authentic will” and consciousness which are devoted to an erotic praxis. Within Critical Pedagogy they are supposed to be freed from the dynamics and internal logic of reality implicitly, in the name of the superiority of the essence of being. In contrast to the Critical Theory’s concept of love, (17) this kind of love is immanently violent, even in the sense of political terror and the control of collective and individual consciousness. Its interest in dialogue is not erotic and transcendent but is what Plato called “popular Eros” (Plato 1927, 344), as manifested by Alcibiades, the great disciple and lover of Socrates. It is not surprising that Alcibiades became a traitor to his fatherland and even to those with whom he sided. Alcibiades’ political acts of betrayal are but a manifestation of his treachery against “the heavenly Eros,”(18) flaunting the earthly superiority of “the popular Eros”(19) and rejecting the struggle for spiritual maturity and transcendence. Freire acts as if he were Alcibiades, finding himself a Socrates who agrees to teach him “the truth”. As in the case of Alcibiades, this “popular Eros” functions as an impetus to a political power game, seeking its expansion through philosophical education and entrance into a dialogue that promises warm and easy love, after being disappointed in transforming “heavenly Eros” into a positive political power/knowledge alternative My argument about Freire’s project is that non-critical and automatic preference for the self-evident knowledge of the oppressed to that of the oppressors is dangerous. The self-evidence of “the people” or a social or cultural group, even when developed to reflectivity by a grand leader-educator, is not without a terroristic potential. On the one hand, the idea is that the educational leader is responsible for the success of the project, while by the same token he (not she) has to be a total lover and be totally loved. This is within the framework of a praxis whose starting point is the self-evidence of the group and earthly politics. This opens the gate to totalitarianism as earthly heaven. These poles, with violence as their secret connection, are manifested in other poles in the system, as personified in the identification of Freire with Che Guevara or Fidel Castro and his own acceptance by his followers as a guru who encourages the groups and creates the horizon of their dialogues. It seems to me that the thinkers of both the first generation of the Frankfurt School, such as Adorno and Horkheimer, and of its second generation, such as Juergen Habermas and Karl Otto Apel, acknowledged the danger of this kind of education. They understood the difference between negation of social conditions alien to ideals of solidarity, understanding, and transcendence and the positive utopia of “love”. The later was a false promise in effect produced a kind of “dialogue” reproducing the inner logic of existing power relations; it prevented transcendence and struggle for autonomy of the individual. Such an education blocks the possibility of counter-education, which is conditioned by an alternative critique. Counter-education as a starting point for a non-repressive critique does not rush into easy optimism, positive utopianism, and “love” of the kind that Freire promised. Within the framework of such a positive utopia, education constitutes itself either on the self-evidence of the group or on that of the leader-educator. That is why this kind of Critical Pedagogy is immanently endangered by overflowing into verbalism, dogmatism, or violence. Since Freire is careful to exclude the third option, his Critical Pedagogy is practically realized within the horizons of verbalism and dogmatism, which constantly threaten the project with unreflective acceptance of the false consciousness and knowledge of the repressed groups, who are unprepared for reflection on the dialogical process in which they are involved. Freire challenges this threat not within radical philosophical education but within political half-conservatism.(20) There are also important emancipatory elements in the anti-elitism of Freire’s and his followers’ Critical Pedagogy. The fall into the perils of violence is not inevitable in this project, even if it is immanent to the system. This version of Critical Pedagogy is of much value for groups and classes in the Third World and for marginalized and controlled groups in the Western world. To a certain degree, this pedagogy even incubates potential refusal of and resistance to the inner logic of capitalism and current technological progress, but because of its central problems it will never develop into anything more than a futile revolt standing on precarious foundations for counter-totalitarianism. The importance and the futility of this project are exemplified, for example, by one of Freire’s best-known American disciples, Ira Shor. Shor describes his experience in trying to criticize the self-evident knowledge of students at a communal college where one of America’s greatest myths - the hamburger - was questioned.(21) However,lacking Critical Theory’s “elitist” general theory, even the greatest achievement of this version of Critical Pedagogy is drawn into the order which it intended to rebel against. Lacking the need and the possibility of conceptualizing and articulating the critical “experience”, this critique is compelled to become another commodity needed in American colleges so as to be successful in the present order of things.

#### Their elevation of personal experience as intrinsically valid is a dangerous political gesture – their notion of liberation is an illusion which works to stave of real change

Gur-Ze’ev 98 (Ilan, Education—Haifa University, 1998 “Toward a Non-Repressive Critical Pedagogy,” http://construct.haifa.ac.il/~ilangz/Critpe39.html)

From this perspective, the consensus reached by the reflective subject taking part in the dialogue offered by Critical Pedagogy is naive, especially in light of its declared anti-intellectualism on the one hand and its pronounced glorification of “feelings”, “experience”, and self-evident knowledge of the group on the other. Critical Pedagogy, in its different versions, claims to inhere and overcome the foundationalism and transcendentalism of the Enlightenment’s emancipatory and ethnocentric arrogance, as exemplified by ideology critique, psychoanalysis, or traditional metaphysics. Marginalized feminist knowledge, like the marginalized, neglected, and ridiculed knowledge of the Brazilian farmers, as presented by Freire or Weiler, is represented as legitimate and relevant knowledge, in contrast to its representation as the hegemonic instrument of representation and education. This knowledge is portrayed as a relevant, legitimate and superior alternative to hegemonic education and the knowledge this represents in the center. It is said to represent an identity that is desirable and promises to function “successfully”. However, neither the truth value of the marginalized collective memory nor knowledge is cardinal here. “Truth” is replaced by knowledge whose supreme criterion is its self-evidence, namely the potential productivity of its creative violence, while the dialogue in which adorers of “difference” take part is implicitly represented as one of the desired productions of this violence. My argument is that the marginalized and repressed self-evident knowledge has no superiority over the self-evident knowledge of the oppressors. Relying on the knowledge of the weak, controlled, and marginalized groups, their memory and their conscious interests, is no less naive and dangerous than relying on hegemonic knowledge. This is because the critique of Western transcendentalism, foundationalism, and ethnocentrism declines into uncritical acceptance of marginalized knowledge, which becomes foundationalistic and ethnocentric in presenting “the truth”, “the facts”, or “the real interests of the group” - even if conceived as valid only for the group concerned. This position **cannot** avoid vulgar realism and naive positivism based on “facts” of self-evident knowledge ultimately realized against the self-evidence of other groups. These conceptions are **all historical**, and do not take seriously the present Western system’s capacity for shaping **all** collective consciousness, not only the ruling group’s. The inner logic of the system is not relevant solely for the center. The system is to be understood as a complex of specific power relations and symbolic dynamics that contains and allows the potentials and limitations of groups and individuals, identities and interests, conceptual possibilities, and economic-technological realities. Within these limits, every element of the system is set, regulated, and activated, thereby receiving its “meaning” and aims. This is the case from the level of the different elements of the psyche to the level of the global sub-systems of production, mobilization, distribution, and conquest. It is made possible by the formation of social, economic, and technological circumstances, as well as by conscious and the psychic ones, which are all contained within the limits of the present order of things. On the one hand, the premises and practices of current standard Critical Pedagogy, by emphasizing the knowledge of marginalized people (not necessarily marginalized knowledge), **might** look like the realization of Foucault’s understanding of truth/power and the recognition that “each society has its regimes of truth....that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true”.(64) On the other hand, **even from a Foucaultian perspective**, the optimism of standard Critical Pedagogy neither recognizes nor challenges Foucault’s common ground with Critical Theory’s conceptions when he writes that “knowledge is also the field of coordination and subordination of statements in which concepts appear and are defined, applied and transformed...”.(65) Deciphering these ways of constructing reality, identity, knowledge, and conceptual possibilities on a historical local and general level might release one from easy optimistic reliance on the vitalism that is implicitly understood to be contained in the alternative knowledge of the marginalized. A pedagogy that overemphasizes the importance of the effectiveness of revolutionary praxis and whose yardstick is power is not to be counted as part of Critical Education or Critical Pedagogy. A Critical Pedagogy that does not suffer from these weaknesses must present itself as an elaboration of the possibility of an alternative spirituality, and as part of an effort to transcend reality and the present realm of self-evidence.

#### Their view of power and white privilege as “norms” that are possessed ignores the process of the constitution of identity. There is no coherent way for non-blacks to participate in their movement because they can’t just ‘take off’ their knapsack of privileges.

McWhorter 5 (Ladelle McWhorter, University of Richmond, “Where do white people come from? A Foucaultian critique of Whiteness Studies,” Philosophy Social Criticism, 31: 533)

It is true then that, as the Whiteness Studies theorists so often say, whiteness is a norm. But the assertion by itself, no matter how often repeated, does very little to further analysis. Placing race – and of course whiteness – in the context of the development of biopower gives a much clearer picture of what it means to say whiteness is a norm and indicates some important directions for further study. Once that context is supplied, the work of historians like Allen, Roediger, and Saxton can help explain why it is whiteness (rather than Saxonness, for example) that functions as the racial norm in the USA. Like Whiteness Studies theorists, Foucault meant for his work to have political effects, to disrupt power formations and make new configurations possible. Looking back on the publication of Discipline and Punish, he had this to say to an interviewer: When the book came out, different readers – in particular, correctional officers, social workers, and so on – delivered this peculiar judgment: ‘The book is paralyzing. It may contain some correct observations, but even so it has clear limits, because it impedes us; it prevents us from going on with our activity.’ My reply is that this very reaction proves that the work was successful, that it functioned just as I intended. It shows that people read it as an experience that changed them, that prevented them from always being the same or from having the same relation with things, with others, that they had before reading it. (Foucault, 2000: 245–6) Unable to continue with ‘business as usual’, people are forced to think critically and make deliberate choices. Power relays are disrupted, which at least opens the possibility that power networks will be realigned and come to function in different ways. Effects like this are what Whiteness Studies theorists aim for as well. They hope their work willbring white people up short, make it difficult for them to continue to function unthinkingly within a white supremacist social system, and make it possible for them to imagine and create different ways of living. Whiteness Studies is less effective at this kind of political intervention than Foucault’s work is, however, and far less effective than it might yet be if it took Foucault’s analytics of power and account of normalization seriously. The problem lies, I believe, in Whiteness theorists’ failure to critique the conception of power that they have inherited from traditional Western political theory. By holding on to a conception of power that insists upon the primacy of a sovereign subject and uncritically deploys economic metaphors of possession and distribution, Whiteness Studies impedes its own efforts to account for the political production of racial subjects and works against its own explicitly stated agenda, i.e., dethroning white subjectivity. I will spend the rest of this essay showing how the conception of power that Foucault critiques still operates in Whiteness Studies. As good students of Omi and Winant, Whiteness Studies theorists believe that racism operates much of the time without the consent or even the knowledge of white subjects. But they still take white subjects to be responsible for racism; **they still believe that racism originates in subjectivity, not in structures or institutions or practices**. This belief is implicit in their search for a psychological account of racism’s persistence. The account offered in virtually every Whiteness Studies theorist’s work can be summed up in two words: white privilege. The story goes that **white people exercise power not so much by exercising their capacity to harm non-white people but by exercising the privileges that hundreds of years of racism have put in place for them**. They are in fact deploying racist power, but they do not see it as such because to them it seems that they are simply claiming for themselves the goods to which they are entitled, and they have a deep investment in being able to continue to do so. Across the very different social analyses that Whiteness Studies theorists put forth and across their very pronounced disagreements over political strategy, this concept of white privilege stretches; it, like the claim that whiteness functions as a norm,unites theorists who otherwise have very little in common. My contention is that **wherever we see the concept of white privilege operating, we can be sure the conception of power that is also operating is the traditional juridical conception that construes power as the possession of a preexistent subject**.No thorough overview of Whiteness Studies ever omits reference to Peggy McIntosh’s article ‘White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack’ (1989). Although McIntosh’s article is tentative and limited to description at a very basic, individualistic level, it popularized the notion that white people possess (like tools in a knapsack) something called ‘white privilege’.11 McIntosh lists 46 of these ‘unearned assets’ (McIntosh, 1988: 1), including such disparate ‘tools’ as: (3) ‘If I should need to move, I can be pretty sure of renting or purchasing housing in an area which I can afford and in which I would want to live’; (5) ‘I can go shopping alone most of the time, pretty well assured that I will not be followed or harassed’; (21) ‘I am never asked to speak for all the people of my racial group’; (22) ‘I can remain oblivious of the language and customs of persons of color who constitute the world’s majority without feeling in my culture any penalty for such oblivion’; (33) ‘I am not made acutely aware that my shape, bearing, or body odor will be taken as a reflection on my race’; and (41) ‘I can be sure that if I need legal or medical help, my race will not work against me’ (McIntosh, 1988: 5–9).One could spend a lot of time critiquing this list and pointing out various problems with it, but what is important here is the focus on privilege itself. McIntosh claims that racism persists because white people use tools that non-white people have not been given. If we want**to eliminate racist exercises of power, white people have to divest themselves of those tools**. Clearly **this**sort of analysis **can never lead to an account of the production and maintenance of white subjectivities within racist regimes of power** – unless all we mean by ‘white subjectivity’ is a generic subject plus a knapsack full of white privileges, a knapsack that the generic subject can jettison without seriously altering its own composition. But that is surely not what the thesis of the social construction of white identity amounts to. So why do Whiteness theorists hang onto this terminology? Why does the concept of white privilege appear in virtually every Whiteness Studies book and article? Lisa Heldke and Peg O’Connor are among the few writers who expend any effort at all trying to justify their use of the concept of white privilege. According to them, the analytic value of the term ‘privilege’ lies in its ability to play the opposite role to ‘oppression’. Everyone generally agrees that there is such a thing as racial oppression and that the members of some races are oppressed, but what of the races that are not oppressed? Heldke and O’Connor write: ‘Some will argue that domination is the companion concept of oppression; they assert that if you are not a member of a particular oppressed group, then you are automatically a dominator’ (Heldke and O’Connor, 2004: 299). They dislike the term ‘domination’, however, because it ‘presupposes that a group or an individual exercises power over another group in very obvious and overt ways’ (ibid.); in other words, it runs counter to the apparent fact that, as analyses like Omi and Winant’s make clear, racism does not operate in obvious and overt ways (at least not by the lights of most white people) and many white people are not aware of its functioning at all. Heldke and O’Connor’s analysis continues: . . . oppression has many different faces; it is created in all kinds of social practices, structures, and institutions. In many instances of oppression, we may not be able to point to any person or group of persons who are actively engaged in dominating the oppressed group . . . We need a companion concept that has as many different faces as does oppression. The concept of privilege will fill the bill; its multiple aspects allow us to describe and understand the roles that different ‘unoppressed’ groups play in the maintenance of oppressive systems. (Heldke and O’Connor, 2004: 299) In sum, within racist societies there are three kinds of people; there are oppressed people (those without much power), dominators (those with power who intend to oppress others), and people who exercise privilege (those with power who do not intend to oppress others but do so anyway). If we hang onto a conception of power that makes it the property of a pre-constituted subjectivity and do not posit that third group, we cannot explain how racism can continue to exist if most people are not avowed racists. We will need a psychological theory to explain the persistence of racism. In other words, if we hang onto a traditional juridical conception of power, we will remain stuck where race theorists were stuck 30 years ago. I contend that the pervasiveness of the term ‘white privilege’ is testament to how deeply and profoundly stuck race theorists typically still are.

#### Vote negative to affirm the countering of violence of the oppressed from a individual standpoint.

#### Vote to negate their strategically oriented praxis. Your ballot can be used as form of counter-education which is able to challenge their dangerous utopianism while mounting a more effective challenge to dominant knowledge production regimes precisely because it refuses to ascribe normative standards for what makes a strategy “emancipatory.”

Gur-Ze’ev 98 (Ilan, Education—Haifa University, 1998 “Toward a Non-Repressive Critical Pedagogy,” http://construct.haifa.ac.il/~ilangz/Critpe39.html)

Critical Theory is committed to universal emancipation, in the sense I have presented, needs not necessarily become dogmatic and negate the plurality of narratives and the acknowledgment of the life-or-death struggle of different narratives constituting the conceptual apparatuses and the consciousness of those enclosed within the horizons. Critical Theory has to acknowledge this plurality. However, this recognition must denote that it is not a mere plurality in which “everything goes”; such a plurality is possible and even necessary within the framework of a certain order that is to be reconstructed, criticized, and resisted. The universality of capitalist production and the omnipotent power of technological progress and its needs are the foundation for the concrete appearance of “difference” today. They are the substratum of the obligatory and “objective” meaning of the power of fashion and the efficiency of the symbolic violence of narratives, identities, and different educational apparatuses. Critical Education should acknowledge this violence in the following manner: On the level where differences are denoted, the epistemological possibilities are determined by the violence of fashion and by the aggressiveness of educational practices. On the universal level, technological progress and capitalist development, as well as the local system’s constructions, enjoy universal validity on the one hand and an omnipotent compulsory dimension on the other, as manifested in the motorized traffic roads, the roads on the Internet, or realized principles of the market economy. The dialectic between these two levels determines the possibilities and limitations of human beings, as well as the constitution of their concrete and most specific life possibilities. However, this is only a partial manifestation of the camouflaged game of being that hides itself from human beings, as Heidegger shows, or as a dimension of the storm that plays with “the angel of history”, as described by Walter Benjamin in his “theses on the philosophy of history”. This is but a manifestation of the realm of self-evidence; within it, there is room for systems such as the one genuine Critical Pedagogy has to struggle against today. The Possibility of a Non-Repressive Critical Pedagogy The educational implications of this understanding can be presented on two levels. On the first, educational implications deviates from confronting the bottom depths of self-evidence and the systems that reflect every realm of self-evidence, the hiding games of the camouflaged being. Such an acknowledgment is not “pessimistic” or “optimistic”, even if historically it was elaborated within the framework of the history of philosophical pessimism.(67) The possibilities of understanding the limits of dialogue and the real horizons in which obligatory power rules are of vital educational potential, even for the ideal of dialogue and the struggle over its conditions and possible realization. The struggle to understanding the ways in which the subject is produced, as well as knowledge, power, and the system’s context of their realization, transformation, and determination, is weakened if one refuses to acknowledge this obligation as an imperative and to strike the lowest depths. Non-repressive education might then be tested only on its surface. Normal Critical Pedagogy is part of this bottom depth. On the second level, human beings are called as individuals, and only as individuals, to decipher the current realm of self-evidence and to demystify the codes and the manipulations of the powers constituting their conceptual possibilities, their life conditions, and their concrete limitations, as well as their dialogical possibilities for struggle and change. On this level, the projects of Critical Theory and some postmodern and feminist thinkers might be partly united, at least in their sensitivities, as exemplified in the work of philosophers such as Seyla Benhabib and Charles Taylor and educational thinkers such as Carmen Luke and Henry Giroux. The development of Critical Theory should be the development of critical philosophy, namely the development of philosophy. It should be theoretically interdisciplinary and politically committed to be involved in society. However, it is wrong to reduce it to mere political work and wrong to judge it according to its educational effectiveness in political terms, as is common in Feminist Pedagogy and in the “paternalistic” versions of Critical Pedagogy. As counter-education it is essentially committed to negate prevailing power games and any kind of strategically-oriented theory and praxis, even when enacted in the name of emancipation. It refuses all versions of educational violence and as such it deserves the name counter-education. While refusing positive utopianism and violence it does not abandon the quest for transcendence and for “the totally different”. It has a Utopian axis, yet its Utopia is negative. The kind of Critical Theory presented here is liberated from the pretension of conventional Critical Theory to be “humanistic” or disconnected from the power games of capitalist symbolic dynamics and objective truths or facts of Instrumental Rationality. I say, clear as crystal: freed radical or critical schools will not be transformed into “a liberated zone”. In this sense, my disagreement is not limited to the naivety of Freire and the pretensions of Giroux, McLaren, Shor and their followers. Here my stand is closer to Foucault and Heidegger, who enlighten the all-penetrating presence of powers and conditions that constitute the human being, the conditions of his/her production, his/her possibilities and limitations. As a non-repressive version of Critical Pedagogy, counter-education should evolve out of this understanding into its struggle over the possibilities of non-repressive critical dialogue, not abstract refusal of the self-evidence, fashions, identities, and pedagogies that produce, distribute, and marginalize or execute these fashions, dynamics, and pedagogies, only in order to exchange them for others. This is where the Utopia presents itself, on which Western reason was traditionally dependent, and on which the humanistic dimensions that are to be protected are still dependent. Within this framework counter-education dwells, with the “hope principle” and the understanding that in principle it cannot be realized in this world as refined, justified, and promising counter-violence. The anti-foundationalist concept of the counter-education presented here cannot suggest any counter-poison. It has no positive and evident alternative to false consciousness, such as “the memory” or “the knowledge” of women, minorities, or the marginalized and oppressed, as suggested in conventional Critical Pedagogy. The counter-education suggested here has no room for any one-dimensional positive alternative, or for any evident foundation for the critique as suggested in the Critical Pedagogy of Freire and Giroux. Even Foucault’s or Derrida’s abandonment of “meaning”, “understanding”, and “dialogue” (68) is negated for the sake of the struggle over the possibilities of a kind of praxis and dialogue that are concerned with the development of the partners and the change made by them in the conditions that prevent or deviate from critical dialogue. On this level, counter-education can offer no more than incomplete, local and painful successes of practical reason, even within the limits of current reality. The counter-education suggested here differs from the normalization practices of hegemonic education in its responsibility to increase the awareness of the strategies and tactics of producing, controlling, representing, and activating reality, knowledge, and subjects as part of a revolt against the current realm of self-evidence, the deception of being, and the forgetfulness of challenging its deception as part of deception, namely, as part of being human. Counter-education challenges self-evidence since, with Benjamin, it does not accept reality as having the last word. Understanding that there is no place for redemption within the framework of history - merely of revolutions - should not prevent counter-education from working out general historiosophic and historiographic theories and concrete social practices. The same is true as for the reconstruction of the system’s efficiency: This does not necessarily imply the acknowledgment of the superiority of power apparatuses over the potential autonomy of the individual, or the superiority of the representation practices and symbolic dynamics over specific philosophical and political possibilities for emancipation. The system contains both (although the latter normally is seen just as a potential), and is activated by the dialectics between them. In this sense, as a non-repressive Critical Pedagogy counter-education should educate to decipher reality, to reconstruct it, and to articulate its practices, possibilities, and limitations, and to act within and on behalf of the ideal dialogue. Here I do agree with Charles Taylor who defends, quite successfully, the possibility of practical reason within the framework of struggle for developing the reflective potential of human beings and their ability for articulation of their world as a realization of their reason.(69) Praxis education of this sort is conditioned by the possibility of developing people’s competence to demystify reality, decipher its codes, and critically reconstruct the demolished potential for human solidarity, cooperation, and the realization of their dialogical essence while acknowledging that in the current historical stage these two missions contradict each other. This acknowledgment might become a power for moral elevation, as in the Bildung tradition to which it critically refers. This transcendence can receive its meaning only within the framework in which a dialogue is immanent, and might change it and enable the self-realization of individuals as part of a solidarian partnership with other reflective politically-oriented human beings.(70) Until the establishment of conditions that will give birth to such a dialogue - conditions that are beyond the present historical horizon - such a non-repressive critical pedagogy might be realized only for isolated individuals and cannot become a matter of collectives. This conception of praxis is very far from the one common in today’s standard versions of Critical Pedagogy; and it is committed and conditioned by spirituality, conceptual possibilities, and socio-cultural conditions that are described by standard Critical Pedagogy as “elitism”. However, just as each human being has no shortcuts, counter-education should try its way by acknowledging that such a spirit, such conceptual possibilities, and such socio-cultural conditions are still a Utopia. The “elitism” of counter-education is indeed directed to demystify and negate any self-evident “knowledge”, but it should criticize any version of elitism, reconstruct its function and aims and, at the same time, strive for conditions under which everyone will be able to become part of the human dialogue. **The negation of opposite ethnocentrism** - of the oppressed - improves the efficiency of intellectual and psychic impotence of people, such as the education that constitutes false dialogues. Such a dialogue must begin from a defined starting point, from the concrete possibilities and limitations of individuals within the framework of the system in which they are imprisoned. In this sense, such dialogue needs some of the achievements of standard Critical Pedagogies, which have to be transformed and de-contextualized. Then, and only then, will the human subject be able to stand up, though not “liberated” and “authentic”, to confront the forgetfulness of being and the central questions and great and small difficulties of the given reality, which as a manifestation of the realm of self-evidence, are not to be changed, yet might be identified and negated. Critique is in this sense a prayer that cannot change the world, but allows transcendence from it. This is the only non-repressive form of hope possible in such an educational project.